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Boethius, Aquinas, Locke and Kant. But his
view is deceptively radical. If he is right, we
are not fundamentally human beings, but
rather self-conscious persons. If there are
“members of some other species, or of no bio-
logical species at all, who exhibit the same
complexity and are able to engage with us, I to
I . . . they belong with us in the order of things”.
What differentiates us from the Martian
anthropologist is not our basic nature – it is a
person, too – but our organic constitution and
environment. The same point holds for per-
sons without bodies. We are, if not ghosts in
machines, then angels incarnate. That is why it
is only a first approximation to say that Scruton
takes us back to Kant and the question: What is
man? On Human Nature is not, in the end, a
book about human nature. It is not about what
makes us distinctively human, as opposed to
Martian, or angelic. It is about the nature we
allegedly share with every rational being. By
rights, there should be a similar book on Mars,
with an equally misleading title, On Martian
Nature, whose contents are virtually the same.
Something has gone wrong. If we are essen-
tially self-conscious and cease to exist when
that capacity dies, then by the same token we
did not exist before it came to be. Since there
is every reason to doubt that a newborn infant
can self-predicate mental states, it follows that
you and I were never born. Our mothers gave
birth to mere animals, not persons. We came
into existence later, where those animals were.
What happened to them? Did they cease to
exist, replaced by the persons we are? More
plausibly, on a view like Scruton’s, they con-
tinue to constitute us. We are the statues to
their organic clay. But the questions do not end
here. If the animals we sprang from constitute
us now, do they have minds of their own? If
not, adult human beings are distinguished
from other animals by their incapacity for
thought! But if the animals that constitute us
think, there are two thinkers here, an animal
and a person. How should we make sense of
self-consciousness when there is more than
one candidate for being me?
In short, the idea that we are not essentially
human beings, but persons constituted by
human beings, runs into paradox. Scruton is
aware of the difficulties, though he shrugs
them off. He can be forgiven for this in a short
book intended for a general audience. But the
puzzles are profound. The idea that we are fun-
damentally human beings is not reductionist
prejudice or misguided deference to the cul-
tural authority of science but scientifically
educated common sense.
Why is Scruton so attached to his concep-
tion of what we are? Even if he is right to
believe that rationality is irreducible, it doesn’t
follow that we are essentially rational. Being
self-conscious and conscious of others: these
are properties we acquire and will eventually
lose. Why think otherwise? The answer is ethi-
cal. If virtues and obligations are explained by
what we are, rooted in our nature, and they are
the same for all rational beings, Martians and
angels alike, our nature must be the same as
theirs. The alternative is an unseemly depend-
ence of ethics on the human condition. It is, in
effect, an ethical relativism, a relativism of
species or life-forms. If ethics is explained by
what we are and our nature differs from that of
the Martian anthropologist, our virtues and
obligations differ, too. 
Though he did not imagine life on Mars, this
is more or less what Aristotle thought. Accord-
ing to his Nicomachean Ethics, since “what is
healthy or good is different for men and for
fishes, but what is white or straight is always
the same, anyone would say that what is wise
is the same but what is practically wise is dif-
ferent”. Theoretical wisdom, knowledge of the
timeless truths of logic, mathematics, and
physics, may be the same for all rational
beings, but practical wisdom is not. The ethics
of rational fish would no more align with ours
than their medical science. Each turns on the
nature of fish, as ours depend on human nature.
Scruton does not address this vision explic-
itly or give voice to the anxieties it provokes.
He conspicuously avoids it. Humanity does
not play for him the role it plays for Aristotle.
At the same time, Scruton does not want to
undermine ethics or to alienate its principles
from our nature. That is why he needs a con-
ception of our nature as persons, not human
beings, and a conception of persons that is
implicitly ethical: “Personhood emerges when
it is possible to relate to an organism in a new
way – the way of personal relations . . . with
persons we are in dialogue: we call upon them
to justify their conduct in our eyes, as we must
justify our conduct in theirs”. On this spare
foundation, Scruton hopes to build an ethics of
reciprocity at odds with the consequentialism
of Derek Parfit or Peter Singer. Their calcula-
tive approach to the greater good he finds
repugnant, tracing the barbarism of Lenin and
Mao to the consequentialist arithmetic of ends
and means. The stakes could not be higher.
The problem is that, while Scruton’s picture
is alluring, it is a fantasy to hope that ethics can
be founded on the bare idea of interaction
among rational beings. For Kant, Scruton
writes, “the motive toward [altruism, forgive-
ness and the pursuit of virtue] is implicit in the
very fact of self-consciousness”. But despite a
footnote insisting otherwise, this view is not
widely shared. Nor is it credible. One way to
see this is to picture a species of rational conse-
quentialists, sacrificing one another for the
greater good. Star Trek has Mr Spock, for
whom the needs of the many outweigh the
needs of the few. If the ethics of reciprocity is
contained in the nature of personhood, as Scru-
ton claims, such beings could not be self-con-
scious or conscious of one another, not without
their consciousness conflicting with conse-
quentialism. This reflects a failure of imagina-
tion. Science fiction tells of rational beings
more wildly unlike us than Spock, beyond
pointy ears to differing modes of reproduction
and sustenance, sociality and solitude, life and
death. They are not impossible and their ethics
need not be ours.
It is not just a bloodless fear of relativism 
that protests against the involvement in eth-
ics of our specifically human nature. It is fear 
of what an unprejudiced examination of our 
nature would reveal. A clinical look at what we 
are in light of biology, social psychology, and 
the dismal history of humanity might disclose 
a nature we cannot embrace. What if human 
beings turn out to be naturally selfish, venge-
ful, sexist? Would it follow that we ought to 
be? One recoils from the thought. But then we 
are left in a difficult place. Scruton’s book 
explores a possible way out. I have been 
emphasizing its difficulties, though I do not 
want to downplay its appeal. Others hope to 
save the objectivity of ethics by divorcing it 
from our nature altogether. 
Both responses are premature. Imagine the
grim discovery that we are hard-wired for self-
interest, or revenge, or sexist attitudes. Why
isn’t the fact that so many of us recoil from this
itself some evidence of human nature? That we
know in advance that we would not treat such
discoveries as guides to life may not be a sign
that ethics is independent of what we are but a
manifestation of the human nature on which it
rests. Our anxiety about the facts of our nature
and how they might turn out may partly answer
itself.
I don’t mean to be sanguine. My point is not
that we already know what human nature is. In
fact, the opposite: my point is a Socratic one,
about the depth of our ignorance. In discussing
human nature, we are speculating about a
question we don’t know how to ask, much less
to answer. The bait-and-switch of Scruton’s
title brings out how little contemporary work
there is in philosophical anthropology. Even
the most basic issues remain unsettled. When
we talk about human nature, do we intend
something invariant, an essence we share with
the sapiens who travelled out of Africa thou-
sands of years ago? Does it change over time,
like the contents of the book our Martian
anthropologist would write if it were asked to
describe how human beings live today? Does
human nature mesh with history in some more
subtle way, as it did for Vico or Marx? Kant’s
fourth question is rarely asked by Anglophone
philosophers. I wish the provocation of Roger
Scruton’s book would influence more of us to
wonder what it means.
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If you were asked to explain philosophy to an
anthropologist from Mars, you could do worse
than begin with Kant’s three questions: What
can I know? What should I do? What may I
hope? These questions define the project of
philosophy in the Critique of Pure Reason and
they have stood the test of time. It is perhaps
more surprising that, in lectures published
nineteen years later, Kant subsumes his ques-
tions under a fourth. In asking what we can
know, what we should do, and what we may
hope, he contends, we are asking: What is
man? At bottom, all philosophy is anthropol-
ogy.
This is not a fashionable thought. For most
contemporary thinkers, the study of human
nature has gone the way of biology, psychol-
ogy, and linguistics, graduating from the
philosophical nursery into the laboratory of
science. Our nature is an empirical subject like
the nature of any animal species and it is to be
studied in much the same way. Philosophy has
no more claim to human nature than it does to
the nature of fish.
To a first approximation, the aim of Roger
Scruton’s eloquent, uncompromising book is
to take us back to Kant. Not afraid to be unfash-
ionable, Scruton wants to repossess our com-
mon nature as a subject for philosophy and a
basis for ethics. The result is a luminous sketch
of what we are, or might be, that will inspire
some readers and infuriate others.
Among those likely to be infuriated are sci-
entists who investigate human nature with the
tools of evolutionary biology. Scruton cites
Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and Steven
Pinker. Though he paints with a broad brush,
he is justifiably impatient with attempts to
reduce the human phenomena of art, reason,
and morality to genetic adaptations. It doesn’t
help to invoke Dawkins’s “memes” (units of
cultural selection) since the theory of their sur-
vival is a patchwork of conjectures and tautol-
ogies that omits what is most essential: our
rational engagement with ideas. We are self-
conscious rational beings and our rationality
does not reduce to the mechanics of genes or
memes, or to the science of the human brain.
Reductionism is a live issue in the philoso-
phy of mind and Scruton is not alone in fight-
ing it. Part of what is distinctive of his view is
that he treats our irreducible rationality not just
as a fact about us but as defining what we are.
“When we talk of creatures like us,” he insists,
“we do not necessarily refer to our species
membership … it is ‘person’ not ‘human
being’ that is the true name of our kind”. A per-
son is a locus of self-consciousness and con-
sciousness of others: “We are the kind of thing
that relates to members of its kind through
interpersonal attitudes and through the self-
predication of its own mental states”. This is
our essence, which is not revealed by human
biology but by philosophical reflection on
self-conscious thought: “your being this per-
son is what (or who) you essentially are. Hence
you could not cease to be this person without
ceasing to be”.
Once more, Scruton is not alone: he cites
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